Daniel Little's blog post 'Moral progress and critical realism' raises some important issues for critical realists and indeed social scientists more generally. I'm sympathetic to the general orientation of his piece, and have made similar arguments elsewhere (summarised in my previous post on Materially Social). I thought it would be useful, though, to add some further discussion of how Daniel's argument relates to critical realism itself, and in particular to the status of Roy Bhaskar's theory of explanatory critique
Monday, 28 August 2017
Monday, 21 August 2017
One of the many ways in which critical realism goes beyond positivism is in rejecting the idea that social science can or should be ethically neutral. Like most critical realists, I see it as part of the role of the social scientist to criticise unjust social arrangements. But for philosophically oriented social scientists, critique cannot come from nowhere - it requires an ethical justification and that justification must be coherent with our wider ontology. Critical realists have taken a variety of conflicting positions on how such a justification could be developed. This post, based on my 2010 paper Realist critique without ethical naturalism and moral realism (open access version) and my address to the Beyond Positivism conference in Montreal in August 2017, argues briefly against Roy Bhaskar's attempts to justify critique on the basis of moral realism. Instead, we must recognise that values are social products and cannot have absolute justifications. That means abandoning the belief that values could be objective, but as I will argue below we can still be judgementally rational about values when we recognise that our values are the product of continuing social debates.
Monday, 17 April 2017
One feature of my book Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy that may puzzle careful readers is that the central ontological concept in it does not match up immediately and transparently with the social ontology developed in my earlier books. PGDE argues that we should explain the economy in terms of complexes of appropriative practices, while my earlier work stresses that causal influence is exerted by entities - people, objects, and social entities like organisations (which are in turn composed of people and often objects too). In this post I propose to explain the relation between the two - and the explanation is of wider importance because it leads us to think about how some social structures can be built on or from other social structures.